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Secretly Severing Joint Tenancies 
Roger Bernhardt6 
Re v Re (1995) 39 CA4th 91, 46 CR2d 62 (reported at 18 CEB RPLR 330 (Nov. 1995)), was 
an interesting variation of the common and distressing problem of one joint tenant surreptitiously 
destroying the survivorship rights of the other. Steven Re did not get along with his sister Pamela 
or his mother Jane, and threatened to partition the joint tenancy real estate they all held. Pamela 
and Jane got back at him by conveying their two-thirds nterests to themselves (as joint tenants). 
This severed their former joint tenancy with Steven, making him a tenant in common as to his 
one-third interest, and passing Jane’s one-third interest to Pamela as surviving joint tenant when 
Jane died a few years later. So, instead of becoming a one-half owner (as one of two surviving 
joint tenants), Steven remained a one-third owner (as a preexisting tenant in common). Jane and 
Pamela executed their deed in 1989, but it was not recorded until the day after Jane died in 1992; 
thus, Steven probably first learned at his mother’s funeral what they had done to him. 
Steven thought that the scheme should have failed because it did not comply with CC 
§683.2(c), which provides that an instrument severing a joint tenancy is not effective unless it is 
either recorded before the severing joint tenant dies or else notarized less than three days before 
death and recorded less than seven days after that death. However, because there is a statutory 
exception for a deed “from a joint tenant to another joint tenant” (CC §683.2(d)(3)), the deed 
from the two women was not required to comply with these formalities because they were both 
grantors and grantees. Such a technical dodge is not available to a married joint tenant who 
wishes to punish his or her younger or healthier spou e, because you don’t get even with your 
mate by conveying directly to her or him. In such cases, the statute is supposed to prevent 
“potentially fraudulent behavior.” Estate of England (1991) 233 CA3d 1, 284 CR 361. However, 
I think the statute prevents lesser and remote fraud without having any real effect on the more 
likely and serious fraud of secretly denying a surviving spouse her expected survivorship rights. 
Had Pamela and Steven been a married couple who had purchased their house in joint tenancy 
(without mom), Pamela might have had her deed to herself recorded before rather than after she 
died, and Steven still would not have known about it, since recordation gives constructive but not 
actual notice. (When was the last time you looked at the records to see what is going on with 
your own title?) Even with a pre-death recordation, Steven would have learned only at the 
funeral that his wife’s half of the house did not g to him. Further, pre-death notarization makes 
the arrangement even less likely to be discovered (an  more likely to be undone if the wrong 
spouse outlives the other), because there is no way to find out whether your spouse has had an 
instrument notarized; these are not public records. 
However, to worry about when the survivor learns of the betrayal is to miss the larger point, 
which is how to prevent the betrayal from occurring  the first place. For instance, in Estate of 
England, supra, James executed an instrument 12 days before his death purporting to sever his 
20-year joint tenancy with his wife Vonda and instead give his interest to his son William. He 
failed because he did not comply with the statute by having the document notarized or recorded 
before his death, but statutory compliance would not have improved Vonda’s situation. 
What Vonda thought when she and James purchased their house was that the survivor would 
be sure to take the entire property on the other’s death, i.e., that the joint tenancy was 
“indestructible.” We lawyers know that it isn’t, and that there is no easy way to make it so. 
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Because California is a community property state, James and Vonda could not take as tenants 
by the entireties, which does prevent either spouse from conveying without the other’s consent. 
They could have taken title as community property, which does prevent unilateral severance by 
virtue of the two-signature requirement of Fam C §1102(a), but James still could have 
disinherited Vonda by merely devising his half interest by will to his son. Prob C §§100, 6101. 
So California couples confront the unpleasant fact tha , depending on how they choose to hold 
title, they can prevent each other either from conveying to outsiders (community property), or 
from devising their interest by will to outsiders (joint tenancy), but not both.  
I can think of three possible solutions for a couple wanting to give each other the necessary 
assurance on this score, although I have never actually tried any of them. Perhaps readers will 
contribute their own ideas, criticisms and experiences. 
1. The couple could take title as joint life tenants with a remainder to the survivor (contingent, 
of course, since the remainderman is currently unascertained). Then, if James secretly conveyed, 
his son’s interest would endure only as long as James stayed alive. This sounds cumbersome and 
costly, but I see no reason why appropriate language could not be approved by the Real Property 
Law Section of the State Bar and then printed on a form deed distributed to brokers by the 
California Association of Realtors, or at least kept in an attorney’s own form files. 
2. The spouses could execute an agreement between themselv s not to sever their joint 
tenancy. Civil Code §683.2 seems to imply that such an agreement would work, providing as it 
does that “[n]othing in this section authorizes severance of a joint tenancy contrary to a written 
agreement of joint tenants.” The section goes on to say that “a severance contrary to a written 
agreement does not defeat the rights of a purchaser or encumbrancer for value in good faith and 
without knowledge of the written agreement.” Civil Code §683.2(b). The requirement that the 
purchaser pay value, however, will take care of gratuitous conveyances to relatives, and the 
presence of the other spouse on the premises (as well as recordation of the document) should 
impute notice to any third party buyer (despite the section’s careless use of “knowledge” rather 
than “notice” as the standard). I realize that thismay technically violate the rule against restraints 
on alienation, but since alienability is left fully intact so long as there are two signatures on the 
deed (which is the requirement for community property), it is hard to think this is any more a 
violation of public policy than a no-assignment clause in a lease. If such an agreement works, 
attorneys could have them ready for clients’ use as part of a standard matrimonial health check 
up. 
3. The couple could take by a deed (again, preprinted) that named them as beneficiaries of a 
trust and designated a third party as trustee, whose s le task would be to convey or encumber the 
title on the mutual instructions of both spouses. Because the trust arrangement created in a deed 
of trust situation requires no additional documentation, I see no reason why this marital trust 
deed should need to be any more elaborate than as described. 
I prefer the idea of a marital deed of trust, probably because real estate attorneys are so 
familiar with deeds of trust in general; but the real question is, which device would the title 
companies be most willing to insure? (Also, the titl  companies are probably easier to work with 
than the legislature.) 
 
